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Quo vadis, Euroland?  









This lecture discusses the 2010 crisis of the European Monetary Union and draws some lessons 
for reform. Crisis resolution has been difficult because the sovereign debt crisis of countries like 
Greece and Portugal has come together with real-estate and banking crises in countries like Ire-
land and Spain and bank vulnerability in countries like Germany and France. Failure to disentan-
gle and resolve the different crises prevents a satisfactory approach to the long-term reform of 
governance of sovereign borrowing and banking. Any such reform must find a substitute for the 
discipline that exchange rate mechanisms impose on sovereign borrowers and their lenders when 
the currency is national. Any mechanism for imposing discipline on sovereign borrowers and 
their lenders must be designed so that enforcement is credible even in a crisis. Recommendations 
for reform include (i) an inclusion of sovereign exposure from too-big-to-fail concerns in bank-
ing in monitoring of fiscal stance, (ii) independence of bank supervisors from their respective 
political authorities, and (iii) a strengthening of the powers of the European Supervisory Authori-
ties over the national supervisors.   
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1. European  Monetary Union Before 2008 
Developments of the past year have led many to say: We told you so. European Monetary Union 
was bound to erode the stability culture that the Bundesbank had nourished so that other coun-
tries were bound to follow. The temptation to finance budget deficits through the printing press 
would be overwhelming. And this prediction has now been confirmed. All the safeguards of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have come to naught. 
This reaction comes in particular from German economists, many of whom accompanied the 
formation of European Monetary Union with dire predictions. They forget that the Maastricht 
Treaty and the protection that European Monetary Union provided to the Bundesbank prevented 
Mr. Lafontaine, the new Federal Minister of Finance in 1998, from changing the Bundesbank 
Act so as to make the institution subservient to the Federal Government. They also forget that 
Mr. Schröder as Federal Chancellor was most prominent in preventing the application of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact in the early 2000’s. In other words, erosion of the stability culture of the 
Bundesbank is also a matter of generation change within Germany. There are reasons to believe 
that European Monetary Union has slowed this erosion rather than accelerated it. 
I have previously commented on these developments in a contribution to the Festschrift for the 
Centenary of the Swiss National Bank, which was written in 2006 and published in 2007.
2 At the 
time, I stressed the following points: 
•  Through the formation of the European Monetary Union, monetary policy has been depoliti-
cized. Whereas the Bundesbank was very much a part of German political debate, the ECB 
as a supranational institution is removed from national political debate. Moreover, national 
politicians who rail against the ECB’s policies find that there are usually other politicians, 
from other countries who have different views about these policies – and who insist that the 
ECB is as much, or as little, beholden to them as to the railing plaintiff.  
•  Depoliticization does not imply an end to frictions and disputes. Disputes about the appropri-
ate intermediate targets of monetary policy or about the tradeoff between a reliance on rules 
and discretion arise naturally, and the central banking community is the more likely to culti-
vate these conflicts, the less it feels threatened by politicians and governments. In the case of 
European Monetary Union there are ample grounds for such “professional” disputes because 
the pursuit of price stability in an area with multiple non-integrated market systems presents 
a difficult new challenge. Moreover, it might take time, for the institution and the surround-
ing media, to get used to the much decreased importance of the exchange rate.  
•  Threats to the ECB’s independence might be expected to come from the European Commis-
sion. The European Commission has a history of ambition to enlarge its own turf. This ambi-
tion has mostly worked against Member State prerogatives, but there was every reason to ex-
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pect it to work against the ECB as well. In fact, in the discussion about the Constitution for 
the European Union, the President of the ECB had already found it necessary to protest 
against a suggestion, which he understood to have come from the Commission, that would 
have “simplified” the procedure changing some of the strategically important articles of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank.  
•  Lack of credibility of the “Stability and Growth Pact” was identified as a problem. It there-
fore seemed likely that, at some point over the medium run, we would come across a prob-
lem like the one that Greece has posed over the last year. For this eventuality, in 2006/7, I 
predicted that the European Union would move forward as it had in past crises, with a mix-
ture of muddling through and changes in governance. I warned that, in such a context, the 
ECB’s independence might be at stake. If a Treaty revision introducing a mechanism to deal 
with the fiscal crisis of a Member State government were to stipulate that, in such a crisis, the 
ECB should contribute to reducing damage and frictions and if this stipulation was part of a 
larger package, then the requirement that changes to the Treaty must be ratified by parlia-
ments in all Member States would not be worth much as a safeguard for the ECB’s inde-
pendence.  
•  Finally, I argued that there is an unnatural tension in a system with a supranational authority 
for monetary policy and national authority in banking supervision. While appreciating that 
bail-outs of insolvent banks belonged in the domain of national finance ministers, I suggested 
that mechanisms of co-ordination and assignments of tasks for the national authorities and 
the central bank as a lender of the last resort were not sufficiently well specified. The infor-
mation that transpired about the various memoranda of understanding on the matter did not 
inspire much confidence. 
2.  Why Is the Current Crisis so Difficult to Handle? 
With hindsight, it is clear that my analysis in 2006/7 was too sanguine. Whereas I expected the 
coming fiscal crisis of a Member State to be dealt with pragmatically, without too much ado, the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis has now been with us for over a year and the European Union is still 
far from finding a way out and from establishing workable governance mechanisms for the fu-
ture. Moreover, we are not just dealing with the Greek sovereign debt crisis, but with crises in 
other countries as well.  
The main reason why it has been so difficult to come to terms with these problems is that we are 
not just dealing with one crisis, but with three crises at the same time. We have, first, the kind of 
fiscal crisis that we see in countries like Greece and Portugal. We have, next, the kind of banking 
crisis that we see in countries like Ireland or Spain, where local banks have gone on lending 
sprees and nourished real-estate bubbles and, when the bubbles burst, their solvency was im-
paired. We have, finally, the kind of latent banking crisis that we see in countries like Germany 
or France where banks with very fragile balance sheets have large exposures to sovereign debt 4 
 
from Southern Europe and/or to bank debt from Ireland and Spain. These three crises are entan-
gled with each other, and it is difficult to disentangle them.  
The difficulties came into evidence after the Deauville meeting of Merkel and Sarkozy when 
they announced that, in the future, under the successor to the EFSF, any support of sovereign 
debtors would require a bail-in of creditor banks. Merkel and Sarkozy thought that they were just 
talking about the future, a regime that was to be imposed after 2013. But they forgot that, as of 
now, there are outstanding bonds that will mature in 2020. Would such bonds benefit from a 
grandfathering clause? Or would the bondholders be subjected to the bail-in requirement after 
2013? Just raising the question creates unrest for today’s financial markets – and for the German 
and French banks that may be holding such bonds. And what about debt that will be maturing in 
2012? This debt will have to be refinanced, perhaps by issuing new debt with a maturity extend-
ing beyond 2013. Conditions under which this debt can be issued in 2012 will depend on pro-
spects for how this debt will be treated after 2013. These conditions in turn affect how today’s 
holders of debt maturing in 2012 assess the prospects of actually receiving their dues. These con-
siderations show that it is difficult to even talk about proper governance post-2013 while we 
must be afraid that the effects of such talk will disturb today’s markets and deepen the triple cri-
sis that we have.  
Following the markets’ reactions to the Deauville announcement, EU finance ministers tried to 
quiet the markets by saying that bail-ins would only be required when a debtor were to have a 
solvency problem. For support with liquidity problems, no bail-in would be required. To me, this 
is another example where concern about the current mess precludes a sensible discussion of fu-
ture governance. From a debtor’s perspective, the problem is always just a liquidity problem. 
And the private creditor will agree if that helps him avoid a bail-in. If you think about the sub-
stance of the matter, you will notice that, for sovereign debt, the concept of insolvency as an ob-
jective inability to pay is not an operational concept. To assess a sovereign debtor’s ability to 
pay, one would have to deal with questions like: What is the debtor country government’s ability 
to get the country’s elites to pay taxes? What is the debtor country government’s ability to get a 
political consensus for selling assets? What is the debtor country government’s ability to restrict 
public-sector salaries? These questions have played a key role in sovereign debt crises, in Wei-
mar Germany as well as the Latin American countries in the eighties, in Greece and, to some 
extent, even in the United States today. Because these questions go to the core of what makes a 
national polity and society, I see no scope for providing “objective” standards for dealing with 
them. By relying on the non-operational distinction between insolvency and illiquidity, the fi-
nance ministers lay the foundations for bad governance in the future.  
If we were able to clean up the current crises right away, we might be able to have a clean slate 
for discussion governance after 2013. Unfortunately, this is not very likely. To some extent, this 
is a matter of technical and legal problems. More importantly, there is no political will to clean 
things up right away. On this point, Germany bears much responsibility. From the very begin-
ning of its intervention in the financial crisis, in October 2008, the German government has been 
bent on preventing transparency about the costs of intervention by shifting risks into the future. 5 
 
In October 2008 and the following months, support was mainly provided in the form of guaran-
tees. As we all know, guarantees do not cost anything, and they do not have to be put on the 
budget. The “bad bank” law in 2009 allowed banks to place dubious assets with the government. 
The government takes current write-offs (or not) on these assets, and a reckoning with the banks 
is deferred for twenty years. The support package for Greece and the EFSF have the great ad-
vantage that you do not have to tell the taxpayers that you are bailing out banks again. The ad-
vantage is all the greater if you can say that you are just dealing with a liquidity problem and no 
taxpayer money will be lost. I am afraid that, as long as there is no change in attitude concerning 
the costs and benefits of transparency, we will not be able to clean up the system, and discus-
sions about governance after 2013 will be contaminated by all three of the crises that we have 
right now.  
In this context, it is not helpful that so much of the political discussion last year has been formu-
lated in terms of solidarity and in terms of a currency crisis. There has been a lot of discussion of 
the sort that if it was not for Greece or Spain, German exports would not be doing as well as they 
are. Therefore, Germany should feel an obligation to support the peripheral countries with their 
debt problems. The story can also be told in another way: If it had not been for European Mone-
tary Union, the interest rate premia for the peripheral countries’ sovereign debts would probably 
have remained where they were prior to 1995, which, except for Greece, is twice as much as 
what they have become after the crisis – and a large multiple of what they were before 2007! 
And Germany would have had a higher real investment and higher real growth in the first half of 
the decade. This part of the story should presumably be part of the solidarity equation as well.
3 
More importantly, talking about these matters in terms of solidarity creates significant political 
risk. Solidarity is a big word which means different things to different people. For a government 
to use taxpayer money in the name of solidarity, there must be some acceptance of this solidarity 
among the electorate. In this respect, there are significant differences across countries, even for 
solidarity within the country itself. Outside of certain political and intellectual elites, there is as 
yet little acceptance of any general notion of cross-border solidarity within the European Union. 
Public political discussion in the European Union mostly takes place along national lines. Within 
the different national discourse communities, notions of solidarity towards other nations tend to 
be seen with suspicion. The European Union is seen as a mechanism that siphons off money 
from national uses. The turbulence of last year’s discussions has very much reinforced these sus-
picions. We may deplore the populism that we see in these debates, but we should not underes-
timate the risk of an uncontrollable political backlash – in all affected member states. In this re-
spect, the open disrespect for existing law that has been shown by many participants has been 
very harmful. So has been the lack of transparency about who is being supported, public em-
ployees in Greece taking early retirement or German and French banks avoiding significant 
write-offs. 
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The discussion has also not been helped by euro-skeptical journalists and populist politicians 
interpreting the crisis as a currency crisis. The crisis is not a crisis of the euro and its internal or 
external stability. The internal purchasing power of the euro has not been affected. The external 
purchasing power of the euro has declined somewhat in the spring of 2010, but the devaluation 
vis à vis the dollar was hardly more than a correction of an excessive revaluation in the years 
2002 – 2009, excessive that is, relative to differences in inflation rates. Journalists and politicians 
like to tell stories about such exchange rate movements, but there is no story to be told. Move-
ments like the ones we have seen have been a recurrent phenomenon since the reintroduction of 
flexible exchange rates in the seventies, and for most of them we do not have any explanations. 
(I also would not wish to refer to the subsequent revaluation of the euro vis à vis the dollar as an 
indication that the crisis had been overcome.) 
As for the governance of the euro, I appreciate that, over the past year, there has been a lot of 
controversy about the behavior of the ECB. However, I do not see this development as running 
counter to the depoliticization and professionalization of the debate about monetary policy that I 
had observed in previous years. The discussions that we have had about ECB policy during the 
last year and a half have mostly not been about issues of independence of the central bank or 
about the responsibilities of the ECB for the overall economy. These discussions have been nar-
rowly focused on how the ECB should deal with the crisis. Leaving aside the legal question of 
whether the ECB’s decisions and policies are compatible with the Treaty, I believe that most of 
those discussions can be interpreted as instances of reasonable professional dissent in central 
banking. Thus, I do not see the ECB as having been captured by President Sarkozy or any other 
head of government or head of state. 
There is a lot of criticism against the ECB buying up all sorts of things, including strange assets, 
toxic assets, etc. I have no idea what the quality of these instruments are but I have been thinking 
that, if the losses are there anyway, they have to be borne by someone and, if the banks that in-
vested in these instruments are unable to bear them, then using seigniorage to cover these losses 
may not be the worst idea. I do, however, fear that if political systems or financial systems get 
used to the ECB solving their problems, then using seigniorage to underwrite losses on poor in-
vestments will end up being a very bad idea indeed.  This is precisely why I believe that we need 
to think about what an appropriate and credible governance system for the period after 2013 
would be.  
3. Underlying  Problems  That Must Be Addressed 
The preceding remarks indicate why the current crisis is so serious and why it is so difficult to 
get out of it. I now turn to the issues that we need to think about when we ask what would be a 
good system of governance for the future. In so doing, I will make believe that the problem of 
transition out of the current crisis can be ignored and proceed as if we could start with a clean 
slate. 7 
 
If we think about what actually went wrong over the last decade, we must be concerned about 
the implications of the lack of an exchange rate mechanism for capital flows and for governance 
in the euro area. In providing a fairly sanguine assessment of European Monetary Union in 2006, 
I very much underestimated this problem.  
We have a common currency, but not a common price system. Markets are not integrated to such 
an extent that regional and national price movements are as highly correlated as they would be in 
a single sovereign region or country. Year by year, the variance of inflation rates across the dif-
ferent member states of Euroland is much higher than the variance of inflation rates across 
American states, Swiss cantons, or German Länder. If exchange rates were flexible, these differ-
ences in inflation rates would by and large be reflected in exchange rate movements. Anticipa-
tion of exchange rate movements would force nominal interest rates to be different in different 
countries. 
In a currency union, however, the exchange rate is fixed, and there is no reason why borrowers 
in different countries whose credit risks are similar should be charged different nominal interest 
rates. When nominal interest rates are the same, however, differences in inflation rates induce 
differences in real interest rates. In countries with higher inflation rates, real interest rates are 
lower, and, ceteris paribus, investment demand will be higher. Higher investment in turn boosts 
aggregate demand, which contributes to rising prices. Some of the capital flows that we have 
seen in the years before the crisis reflected these differences – in inflation rates, real interest rates 
and investment demand – and reinforced them. Thus funds flowed from countries like Germany, 
where inflation was much below the average and therefore real rates were higher, to banks – and 
ultimately real-estate investors in countries like Ireland and Spain where inflation rates were 
higher and real interest rates accordingly low. For public debtors in the peripheral countries, 
there also was the temptation to borrow more as entry into the European Monetary Union had 
eliminated the high risk premia that they had had to pay in the past.
4  
I am not concerned about these capital flows per se. As a consequence of monetary union, some 
such capital flows were to be expected – and were fully intended. Previous interest rate differen-
tials had been very high and had contributed to preventing capital from flowing to destinations 
where it would be most productive. After all, these interest rate differentials contained not just 
the premia for expected differences in inflation rates or expected exchange rate movements, but 
also the premia for the associated exchange rate risks. Eliminating these impediments to the flow 
of capital would contribute to raising welfare in countries receiving these flows and putting them 
to productive use as well as providing returns for investors in countries with surplus savings.  
However, governance mechanisms for these capital flows were insufficient. Capital flows to 
banks in Ireland and Spain took too little account of the dangers inherent in the Wicksellian dy-
namics of real interest rates, investment and housing price appreciation generating a bubble. In 
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Greece and Portugal, there was too little concern about fiscal sustainability. In both contexts, 
there was a lack of discipline, on the side of lenders as well as borrowers.  
This lack of discipline was to some extent due to the lack of an exchange mechanism. For a 
country that has its own currency, the exchange rate typically provides a disciplining mechanism. 
This mechanism may work because it goes against the country’s pride to see the exchange rate 
devalued, and therefore policies that destroy the international competitiveness of important in-
dustries may come to be questioned when the loss of competitiveness affects the exchange rate. 
Or it may work because lenders distrust the country government’s ability to finance its activities 
without using the printing press and therefore refuse to lend in the country’s currency, a constel-
lation which Eichengreen and Hausmann have called original sin.
5 
Many argue that, if only Greece or Portugal had been able to borrow in their own currency, they 
could now devalue their currencies and they would be fine again. Arguments get the matter 
backwards. If these countries still had had their own currencies, they would not have been able to 
borrow in their own currencies in the first place, at least not to the same extent and at the condi-
tions that they actually got. Given the constraints on domestic-currency borrowing, they might 
have borrowed in foreign currencies, but, as they did so, they would have had to consider the 
risks inherent in such borrowing. With significant foreign-currency-denominated loans outstand-
ing, they would have to consider that a devaluation of the currency would not only restore the 
international competitiveness of some industries but also inflate the value of their foreign-
currency-denominated debt in terms of the home currency. The experiences that Latin American 
countries have gathered over the past three decades with different exchange rate policies provide 
ample warnings. None of them has been able to eliminate the consequences of original sin, the 
inability to borrow freely in one’s own currency and the risks inherent in foreign-currency bor-
rowing.  
In Euroland, the disciplining mechanisms that are based on exchange rate movements and ex-
change rate risks are missing. On the one hand, as mentioned, this reduces frictions and enhances 
efficiency in cross-border capital flows. On the other hand, it increases the temptation for sover-
eign borrowers and their lenders to neglect fiscal sustainability.  
Fiscal sustainability, fiscal discipline and a respect for (intertemporal) government budget con-
straints are important because each member state government is in principle independent and 
sovereign in its own fiscal policy. This independence is the only way to accommodate the very 
different attitudes towards fiscal policy and, more fundamentally, towards the role of the state 
that we have in different countries. For instance, the UK has a very strong market orientation in 
economic policy, the French government a very strong desire for state control over the economy. 
(Germany is somewhere in between, in principle very market oriented but in the details some-
times quite interventionist.) These differences induce difference in the extent to which economic 
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fluctuations put the government at risk. It would be difficult to put the implied fiscal policies 
under a common set of principles. 
Differences in attitudes towards the role of the state also concern the question how much society, 
and in particular the social and economic elites, are willing to pay for the state. In the case of 
Greece, as in Latin America three decades ago or Weimar Germany in the twenties, we are not 
just talking about an external transfer problem; we are also talking about an internal transfer 
problem due to the unwillingness of significant parts of society to contribute to government fi-
nance.
6 In this context, of course, we also must take account of the expensive monuments that 
statesmen like to build to themselves, Olympic Games and the facilities that they require, or cer-
tain kinds of industrial policy, industrial policy as a disguise for social transfers or industrial pol-
icy as a realization of economically unviable technical dreams like the Concorde. 
In all these issues, political legitimacy is derived from national political discourse. EU interfer-
ence is resented and cannot be taken too far. Therefore, it is all the more important for partici-
pants in national discourse to be aware of the fact that the government is subject to a budget con-
straint, and that the presumed benefits of certain policies and certain monuments must be com-
pared to their costs. In this respect, the elimination of a disciplining mechanism for government 
borrowing is very problematic.  
The Stability and Growth Pact should have provided for such a mechanism, but in the early 
2000’s, Germany and France prevented its application because their governments considered the 
Pact to be an infringement of their sovereignty. This experience carried a more general lesson, 
namely, arrangements for imposing fiscal discipline will not work if the parties whose job it is to 
enforce them are not interested in doing so. This was true of the Council with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. It was also true of the Commission with the No-Bail-Out Clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty. In last year’s crisis, the Commission had nothing to gain by fulfilling its official role as a 
guardian of the Treaty. In contrast, it had a prospect of significantly enlarging its own turf by 
working towards a new regime that would provide for inter-state bail-out in the European Union. 
Given these experiences, I find it remarkable that negotiations about future governance have 
completely neglected the problem of credibility.
7 Ever since Deauville, we have been en route 
towards a Stability and Growth Pact 2, which is going to have the same governance problems as 
its predecessor. 
Current discussion focuses on “competitiveness”. As far as I can tell, this is a weasel word that 
makes believe that EU institutions are addressing the issues when, in fact, the meaning of the 
word is not clear. In the present context, it might be deemed to concern the problem that higher-
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than-average wage and price inflation in a member state erodes the ability of firms in that state to 
compete in domestic, EU and world markets. This problem is associated with the kind of Wick-
sellian dynamics that I mentioned above, where differences in inflation rates induce differences 
in real rate of interest, which then drive capital flows. This being said, I fail to see what policy 
interventions would be called for and what policy instruments would be used to deal with such 
developments. (Remember that wage setting mechanisms are quite different in different coun-
tries.)  Nor do I see how EU institutions would induce member state governments to actually 
intervene. I therefore suspect that word itself is a device used to hide the fundamental dissent 
between different member states as to what the economic coordination mechanism should be that 
the Council is presumably looking for.  
Coming from a background in microeconomics and competition policy, I feel very uneasy about 
the word “competitiveness” because it has been abused so much. When a politician uses the 
word “competitiveness”, he usually means that he wants his country’s “champions” to conquer 
the world. For this purpose, he does not mind subsidizing them with taxpayer money or giving 
them a monopoly position at home as a generous source of finance. Having observed Mr. Sar-
kozy in his previous incarnation as Minister of Finance at the time of the Sanofi-Aventis merger, 
I know that this is his mode of thinking. I am therefore concerned that a governance arrangement 
focused on “competitiveness”, which makes sense in some macro settings where you are talking 
about wages being set semi-exogenously through collective bargaining or through the govern-
ment providing a benchmark, may end up being intermingled with particular notions about mi-
croeconomics and competition policy, in an attempt to get the rest of the European Union to 
adopt a form of industrial policy which, for France, has been very costly, one of those monu-
ments that politicians like to build for themselves.
8 
So far, I have only talked about the problem of fiscal discipline on the side of the borrower.  
What about the lenders? The Wicksellian dynamics to which I pointed were driven by differ-
ences in real rates of interest that are induced by differences in inflations rates when nominal 
rates of interest are the same. But, why should nominal rates be the same? Why should we take it 
for granted that interest rates on Greek government bonds ought to be (almost) the same as inter-
est rates on German government bonds? If fiscal sustainability in the different countries is differ-
ent, nominal interest rates should be different. Yet, prior to the crisis, differences in nominal in-
terest rates for different member state governments were negligible. Were there no reasons to 
believe that default risks differed? In my 2007 paper, I observed that the failure of financial insti-
tutions and financial markets to take account of the fact that different sovereign borrowers had 
different fiscal capacities represented an anomaly.  
The anomaly can now be explained. Market participants gamed the system, and they seem to 
have been right. Of course I am just speculating here about what bankers thought in 2001, 2002, 
and so on. They might just have been dumb and not appreciated that the different member states 
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differed in their ability to pay their debts. But they might also have been very clever and antici-
pated that the Maastricht rules were not going to withstand the pressure of a crisis. If this is what 
they thought, they were right, at least so far. They may yet be proved to have been wrong if the 
debts they hold will be subjected to haircuts after all. However, the very weakness of the banks 
in the wake of the subprime-mortgage crisis provides a strong reason why governments have 
shied away from such haircuts.  
If we want the lenders to take a part in imposing discipline on borrowers, we need to have bail-
ins in the future. On this point, however, we should not deceive ourselves. There has been a lot 
of talk, but as yet no scheme that I would consider to be credible. If a new treaty this year or next 
year stipulates bail-ins of creditors in future debt crises, I expect that, if by 2020, we have anoth-
er debt crisis and the solvency of banks is at risk, the bail-in clauses that are agreed now will be 
found to be just as good as the sanctions mechanism of the Stability and Growth Pact or the no-
bail-out clause of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the banks will know this, and, given the ex-
perience we have just had, they will be confident about their ability to “convince” the European 
Union and its member states that the application of bail-in clauses in a crisis is likely to have dire 
consequences. 
4. Some  Recommendations 
In thinking about future governance, we must above all worry about the credibility of the regime 
we install. There is no foolproof recipe for doing so, but some improvements over the current 
regime – and current plans should be possible. Most importantly, we should begin to think about 
banks, their behavior and their governance, as part of the problem of Euroland governance. Until 
now, discussions about banking systems and discussions about Euroland governance have been 
treated as if they were completely unrelated. I consider this separation of the two sets of issues to 
be a big mistake. We need to integrate the discussions of the governance of the banking system 
with the discussion about how to reform the Euro system. In the following, I formulate a few 
recommendations in this direction. 
Recommendation 1: Whatever governance mechanism is set up to discipline fiscal policy should 
be sensitive to information about the country’s banking system. 
This recommendation is based on the observation that fiscal problems in Ireland and Spain have 
not arisen from unsound fiscal policies but from unsound banking practices, in combination with 
a too-big-to-fail or a too-political-to-fail approach of the government. By the terms of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, Ireland and Spain were doing wonderfully even as the risks were building 
up. The problems that caused the Irish situation to blow up and that are still causing significant 
pressure for Spain never even appeared on the radar screen of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Given that banking systems can be too political to fail and given that bank bail-outs may overtax 
the national taxpayers, institutions observing fiscal sustainability should have an eye for banking 12 
 
developments and the fiscal risks they imply. In my opinion, this matter is not being given 
enough attention. 
 
Recommendation 2: Make bank supervisors independent. 
Traditionally, banking supervision has been treated as a national prerogative, usually in the do-
main of the finance minister. In the past, I have supported this arrangements on the grounds that, 
with too-big-to-fail policies, ultimately, the risks of poor banking supervision are borne by the 
taxpayer. If we look at the actual record, however, for how banking supervision has done under 
the authority of finance ministers, I find that there is a good case to be made for independence. In 
the years prior to the crisis, governments have been more concerned about not throwing sands 
into the wheels of “their” banks than about protection of taxpayers from the fallout of the risks 
that these banks assumed. This has been the case in Ireland, where the government and the su-
pervisors did not want to damage the ability of Irish banks to get funds from abroad. This has 
also been the case in Germany where the government and the supervisors did not want to inter-
fere with the ability of the Landesbanken and of the real-estate-finance institutions to earn mon-
ey abroad. In both cases, taxpayers were not served well by government use of authority over 
banking supervision. The rationale for this authority is thereby undermined. 
Underlying these failures is the deeper problem that politicians and governments tend to look at 
banks as a source of funds rather than a source of risks. When this attitude prevails, they are 
more concerned about getting the banks to fund close to the politicians’ hearts than about getting 
them to avoid risks that might be costly to the taxpayers. Whereas, in theory, supervision under 
the authority of the finance minister reflects the potential involvement of taxpayers in bailing 
banks out, in practice, it may provide the basis for a symbiosis of governments and banks, where  
banks provide funds for certain activities and governments protect the banks from excessive 
competition. Before the deregulation of the seventies and eighties, there were many regulations 
that explicitly called for bank funding of specified activities, with highly adverse effects on the 
risks to which banks were exposed, while government guarantees as well as restrictions on com-
petition in banking provided the banks with rents. Examples are geographic restrictions on mort-
gage lending (Texas), very high minimum reserve requirements (Portugal), requirements to in-
vest in government bonds (Sweden). The symbiosis thrived on the lack of transparency about the 
costs of political intervention and the lack of transparency about the risks to which banks were 
exposed. 
Even after the financial crisis, the underlying attitude is still there. Discussions about Basel III 
were dominated by banks claiming that sharper regulation would induce a credit crunch, as if a 
lack of funding possibilities had been a key characteristic of the past decade. The German gov-
ernment was most concerned about preserving the status of public-sector banks in Germany, 
among them the main culprits in the crisis, with estimated costs to the taxpayer in the range of 50 
bn. to 150 bn. EUR. Given the observation that, in practice, governments are not much con-13 
 
cerned with risk from their banks and that prudential supervision is often blunted or even abused 
for political purposes, the theoretical case for putting banking supervision under the authority of 
the government seem practically irrelevant. 
Recommendation 3: Strengthen the competences of European supervisory institutions and of 
European networks of national supervisors.  
I have two reasons for this recommendation. First, the Irish experience shows that banking su-
pervision at the national level can have significant repercussions for other member states of the 
European Union. Charles Goodhart’s saying, “Banks are international in life, but national in 
death”, does not quite fit the Irish experience.
9 In Euroland today, the costs of bank bail-outs are 
not just borne by the national taxpayer but by taxpayers all over. This suggests that national 
banking supervision should be subject to some co-ordination and control at the supranational 
level. 
Second, I believe that the problem of regulatory capture is reduced if we have a network of bank 
supervisors acting in co-ordination but with some degree of independence. Something like this 
has been observed in competition policy for network industries such as telecommunications or 
electricity. Here, the workings of the European networks of national regulators  have reduced the 
amount of capture by comparison to what we had before, largely, I believe, because each regula-
tor could point to regulators in other countries as benchmarks. Just as  importantly, the desire to 
be accepted by one’s peers at the European level has affected the motivation of sector-specific 
regulators.   
A final point: I would not wish to have banking regulation integrated into the central banks. In 
the crisis, it did not make much of a difference whether a country’s supervisory authority was 
integrated with the central bank or not. This suggests that this question is of little consequence 
for the performance of banking supervision. However, the American experience shows that, if 
banking supervision and monetary policy are under the same roof, the integrity of monetary poli-
cy can be compromised by concerns about financial institutions. Such a development can lead to 
bad monetary policy. It can also become a source of moral hazard as the financial industry de-
velops a sense that, if they get into trouble, the central bank will bail them out. There should be 
transparency in the sense that supervisors should know where monetary policy is going and the 
central bank should know what the state of the financial system is, but the different functions 
should not be under the responsibility of the same institution.  
                                        
9   C.A.E. Goodhart, “Procyclicality and financial regulation,” Banco de España, Estabilidad Financiera 16 
(2009), p. 16. Goodhart puts the formulation in quotation marks, perhaps in deference to Mervyn King’s 
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